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Summary
In the last 30 years various mathematical models have been used to identify the effect
of component failures on the performance of a system.  The most frequently used
technique for system reliability assessment is Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and a large
proportion of its popularity can be attributed to the fact that it provides a very good
documentation of the way that the system failure logic was developed.  Exact
quantification of the fault tree, however, can be problematic for very large systems and
in such situations approximations can be used.  Alternatively an exact result can be
obtained via the conversion of the fault tree into a binary decision diagram.  The binary
decision diagram, however, loses all failure logic documentation during the conversion
process.
This paper outlines the use of the Cause-Consequence Diagram method as a tool for
system risk and reliability analysis.  As with the fault tree analysis method, the Cause-
Consequence Diagram documents the failure logic of the system.  In addition to this
the Cause-Consequence Diagram produces the exact failure probability in a very
efficient calculation procedure.  The Cause-Consequence Diagram technique has been
applied to a static system and shown to yield the same result as those produced by the
solution of the equivalent fault tree and binary decision diagram.  On the basis of this,
general rules have been devised for the correct construction of the Cause-Consequence
Diagram given a static system.  The use of the cause-consequence method in this
manner has significant implications in terms of efficiency of the reliability analysis and
can be shown to have benefits for static systems.
21. Introduction
Analysis of industrial systems is carried out to aid in the protection of facilities and to
help reduce the risk of adverse events such as loss of profit, injury or death by
reducing the frequency or consequences of such accidents.  Since the early 1960's
various mathematical models have been used to perform reliability analysis in order to
predict the likelihood that a system will function given a demand.  Each analysis model
has different features which make it more appropriate to some system types than
others and to achieve the most efficient analysis the simplest technique should be
utilised.
The most commonly employed technique used to assess the probability of failure of
industrial systems is the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) method (1). For systems
containing independent failure events it has been shown that the FTA technique
produces a logical description of the failure process and can also yield, among other
things, the systems unreliability.  It has been highlighted, however, that this technique
has limitations even when it is applied to systems containing independent failure
events.  Qualitatively, if the fault tree is complex then finding the minimal cut sets can
be CPU intensive.  In addition to this the exact top event probability, found via the
inclusion-exclusion formula, may also be computationally expensive if the system
contains even a moderate number of minimal cut sets.  In the past this problem has
been solved by using approximations for the top event probability.  These
approximations, however, can be inaccurate if the likelihood of component failure is
not small.  The problem of inaccuracies due to approximation techniques has been
alleviated recently by the development of the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD)
approach (2).  
BDDS are based on Bryant's trees (3) and obtain the exact top event probability
efficiently by expressing the system failure modes as disjoint paths.  The calculation of
the top event probability is achieved by summing the probabilities of these disjoint
paths.  This analysis procedure makes the BDD technique more efficient than the
traditional FTA technique.  The BDD however cannot be constructed from the system
description and is developed from the fault tree representation of the system.  During
the conversion process the BDD loses all the causality information that is represented
in the fault tree structure.  In addition to this an inefficient ordering of the basic events
can result in an excessively large diagram, which can prove difficult to analyse reducing
the efficiency of the method.
A technique, however, has been developed that represents all system outcomes, given
an initial event, on a diagram which contains a full textual description of the systems
behaviour and produces an exact quantification of the system failure probability.  The
technique is based on the Cause-Consequence Diagram method which was developed
at RISO laboratories in the 1970's to aid in the reliability analysis of nuclear power
plants in Scandinavian countries (4).  The method involves the identification of the
potential modes of failure of individual components and then relates the causes to the
ultimate consequences for the system (5).  The consequences evaluated include those
3that represent system failure as well as those that represent other system behaviour.
As all consequence sequences are investigated the method can assist in identifying
system outcomes which may not have been envisaged at the design stage.
Cause-Consequence analysis is most frequently applied to systems where the system
state changes with time (6,7).  No literature exists which documents the application of
the Cause-Consequence Diagram method to a static system and this is the topic of this
paper.  Rules for construction and quantification of a Cause-Consequence Diagram
representing a static system have been developed and applied to an example system.
2. The Cause-Consequence Diagram Method
The Cause-Consequence Diagram is developed from some initiating event, i.e. an event
that starts a particular operational sequence or an event which activates certain safety
systems.  The Cause-Consequence Diagram comprises two conventional reliability
analysis methods the FTA method and the Event Tree Analysis method. The Event
Tree method is used to identify the various paths that the system could take, following
the initiating event, depending on whether certain subsystems/components function
correctly or not.  The fault tree method is used to describe the failure causes of the
subsystems considered in the event tree part of the diagram.  This relationship is
shown in figure 1.
INITIATING EVENT
 CONSEQUENCE PART:
 IDENTIFICATION OF
 SEQUENCE DEPENDING ON
 ACCIDENT-LIMITING
 SYSTEMS: EVENT TREE
 ANALYSIS
 CAUSE OF ACCIDENT-
 LIMITING SYSTEMS:
 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
Figure 1 Structure of the Cause-Consequence Diagram
2.1 Symbols used for a Cause-Consequence Diagram
The symbols used for construction of a Cause-Consequence Diagram are illustrated in
table 1.
4SYMBOL FUNCTION
   
Component /System
Functions Correctly
 NO        YES
qi
Ft1
The Decision Box represents the
functionality of a component/system.
The NO box represents failure to
perform correctly, the probability of
which is obtained via a fault tree or single
component failure probability qi
                   Ft1
Fault Tree Arrow represents the number
of the fault tree structure which
corresponds to the decision box
                                         λ =
The initiator triangle represents the
initiating event for a sequence where λ
indicates the rate of occurrence
Time delay 1 indicates that the time
starts from the time at which the delay
symbol is entered and continues up to
the end of the time interval in the delay
symbol
                           
OR gate symbol: Used to simplify the
Cause-Consequence Diagram when more
than one decision box enters the same
decision box or consequence box
Consequence Box represents the
outcome event due to a particular
sequence of events.
                Table 1 Cause-Consequence Diagram Symbols and Functions
2.2 Rules for Construction and Quantification
The Cause-Consequence Diagram technique has been applied to a static system and
shown to yield the same results as those produced by the solution of the equivalent
fault tree.  On the basis of this study general rules have been devised for the correct
construction of the Cause-Consequence Diagram given a static system.  The use of the
cause-consequence method in this manner has significant implications in terms of
efficiency of the reliability analysis and can be shown to have benefits for static
systems.  The algorithm for static system analysis is as follows:
Step 1 Component Failure Event Ordering
If order of failure is irrelevant, which is the case in a static system, then the Cause-
Consequence Diagram can be initiated by considering any of the components in the
system.  The analysis of the Cause-Consequence Diagram should yield identical results
regardless of the component or variable ordering, however the actual diagrams may
vary in size.  The first step of the Cause-Consequence Diagram construction is
therefore deciding on the order in which component failure events are to be taken.  To
t = xhrs
5ensure a logical development of the causes of the system failure mode it was decided
that the ordering should follow the temporal action of the system, for example the
systems activation for the function required.
Step 2 Cause-Consequence Diagram Construction
The second stage involves the actual construction of the diagram.  Starting from the
initiating component the functionality of each component or sub-system is
investigated and the consequences of these sequences determined.  If the decision box
is governed by a sub-system then the probability of failure will be obtained via a fault
tree diagram.
Step 3 Reduction
If any decision boxes are deemed irrelevant, for example the boxes attached to the NO
and YES branches are identical and their outcomes and consequences are the same, then
these should be removed and the diagram reduced to a minimal form.  Removal of these
boxes will in no way affect the end result.  This is illustrated in figure 2 where failure
(F) occurs due to either of the two paths that terminate in the failure consequence.  On
one path the component A works, on the other it fails proving that the state of
component A represented by the decision box is irrelevant.
Component A
Functions Correctly
 NO        YES
Component B
Functions Correctly
 NO        YES
Component B
Functions Correctly
 NO        YES
F
F = System Failed
W = System Works
W F W
Figure 2 Redundant Decision Box
When a redundant decision box is identified, reduction is achieved by removing the box
and entering the next decision/consequence box encountered in its place.  Each decision
box is inspected and when no further redundancies exist the Cause-Consequence
Diagram is deemed minimal.
Step 4 System Failure Quantification
The probability of each consequence for a static system is determined by summing the
probability of each set of events which lead to this particular outcome.  Each sequence
probability is obtained by simply multiplying the probabilities of the component
events represented by the branch, as illustrated by Nielsen (8).  This is possible as
6each sequence of events is mutually exclusive and the probability of component failure
events are assumed independent.  The 4-step procedure can be represented in a
flowchart as shown in figure 3.
Any Irrelevant
Decision
Boxes?
Decide On Ordering
Due to Temporal
Action of the System
Construct Cause-
Consequence
Diagram by
considering
functionality of each
sub-system/
component
Reduce Cause-
Consequence
Diagram by removal
of redundant boxes
ANALYSISNo
Yes
             Figure 3 Flowchart for Cause-Consequence Diagram Construction
3. Example 1: Three Component System
The Cause-Consequence Diagram approach for static systems can be demonstrated by
application to a very simple system example.  In the approach it is shown why the
method has potential advantages in comparison to a conventional fault tree study for
larger systems.  The example system contains three components A, B and C and
system failure is caused by either A and B failing together or C failing alone.  The
system failure causes are illustrated as a fault tree structure in figure 4.
G 1
TOP
A
C
B
                                             Figure 4 Example Fault Tree
The Cause-Consequence Diagram was constructed and analysed using the algorithm
developed.
7Steps 1 and 2 Component Failure Event Ordering and Cause-Consequence
Diagram Construction
The ordering chosen was that of A, B, C and the Cause-Consequence Diagram was
constructed by inspecting the failures of those components in that order (Figure 5).
Step 3 Reduction
Boxes 3 and 4 are both irrelevant and were therefore removed.  This process reduced
the Cause-Consequence Diagram, the final form being illustrated in figure 6, and as no
further redundancies existed the diagram was minimal.
Figure 5 Cause-Consequence Diagram for three component system
Figure 6 Reduced Cause-Consequence Diagram
1   2     3         4        5   6       7 8
Component B     2
Func tions Correctly
 NO        YES
Component C
Functions            4
 NO        YES
Component C
Functions           5
 NO        YES
F F F W
Component B     3
Functions
 NO        YES
Component C
Functions            6
 NO        YES
Component C
Functions           7
 NO        YES
F W F W
Component A     1
Functions Correctly
 NO        YES
F: System Failure
W: System Wo rks
q a
qb qb
qc qc qcqc
    4        5
       1
2        3
Component A
Functions
 NO      YES
 Component B
 Functions
  NO      YES
 Component C
 Functions
  NO      YES
F
F: System Failed
W: System Works
F W
Component C
Functions
NO       YES
F W
qa
qb qc
qc
8Step 4 System Failure Quantification
The probability of system failure is equal to the sum of the probability of the 3
sequence paths that lead to the consequence 'F'.  Therefore since the paths are
mutually exclusive:
Probability of Failure = P(Path 1) + P(Path 2) + P(Path 4)
                                   = qA.qB + qA.(1-qB).qC+ (1-qA).qC
                                   = qA.qB + qA.qC - qA.qB.qC + qC-qA.qC
                                   = qA.qB + qC- qA.qB.qC
The fault tree quantification, using the exact method, calculates the top event
probability to be identical to that obtained by the Cause-Consequence Diagram
approach. By studying the reduced form of the Cause-Consequence Diagram it can be
noted that it is equivalent to the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) for the fault tree in
figure 4, with the variable ordering  A<B<C (Figure 7).  The top event probability can
also be obtained directly from the BDD by multiplying the probabilities down the
paths that lead to the terminal 1 node (9).
Figure 7 BDD with variable ordering A<B<C
4. Repeated Events
If the four stage procedure developed to construct and analyse a Cause-Consequence
Diagram is to be considered as a generally applicable approach it must be capable of
dealing with the events which occur in more than one fault tree structure attached to
the decision boxes in any sequence path.  It can be shown that the Cause-Consequence
Diagram method can deal with repeated events in a more efficient way to that used for
FTA.  Using the Cause-Consequence Diagram method there is no need to obtain the
Boolean expression of the top event and then manipulate it to produce a minimal form
prior to analysis.  The cause-consequence method deals with sequences of events
which either occur (fail) or not occur (work).  The probability of a particular outcome
1      0
  1       0       1 0
       1          0
AB + C
A
C
CB
0
0
1 1
1
9is obtained by summation of the probability of all paths that lead to the outcome.
Summation of the probabilities of the mutually exclusive paths results in the
development of the reduced form which would be obtained from the fault tree
following Boolean reduction.  An algorithm has been developed that can trace through a
Cause-Consequence diagram, identify and extract any repeated basic events in more
than one fault tree structure on the same sequence path.  The procedural steps used in
the extraction algorithm are:
1)  Identify the fault tree structures in the path under inspection.
 
2)  Each fault tree identified in a path undergoes a modularisation process (10) and the
independent subtrees identified are stored.
 
3)  Each independent subtree for each fault tree diagram is compared to one another
and following the identification of any common subtrees or individual basic events
the Cause-Consequence Diagram is modified.
 
4)  The Cause-Consequence Diagram is modified using the following rules:
i)  Following the identification of a common subtree or basic event the
common element is extracted and set as a new decision box at the highest
point in the Cause-Consequence diagram which has all dependencies below
it.
ii)  The Cause-Consequence diagram is then duplicated on each branch starting
from the new decision box.
iii)  Having developed a single decision box for the common subtree or basic
event, the decision boxes that contained the common event prior to
extraction require modification.  The common event/s are set to 1 (TRUE)
in the fault trees following the NO outlet branch from the new decision box,
as this indicates failure, and 0 (FALSE) in the fault trees following the YES
outlet branch to signify that the common event/s works.
iv)  After extraction of the common subtree or basic event each fault tree which
has been modified requires reorganisation. Each fault tree containing the
extracted Boolean variable is inspected and the fault trees modified by
setting the Boolean variable to represent the path taken in the cause-
consequence diagram.
v)  The Cause-Consequence Diagram is then reduced to a minimal form by
removing any redundant decision boxes identified.
This procedure is repeated until all sequence paths have been inspected and no
repeated subtrees or basic events discovered.
5. Industrial Example
As an example the technique has been applied to the simple high pressure protection
system depicted in figure 8. The basic functions of the components present in the high
pressure protection system are shown in table 2.  The function of the system is to
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prevent the passage of a high-pressure surge.  The high pressure originates from a
production well and the equipment to be protected are vessels located downstream on
the processing platform.
Figure 8 High-integrity protection system (HIPS)
The first level of protection is the emergency shutdown (ESD) sub-system.  This
comprises of 3 pressure sensors, for which 2 out of 3 must indicate a high pressure to
cause a trip.  Three shutdown valves, a Master, a Wing and an ESD valve activate to
trip.  If a high pressure surge is detected then the ESD system acts to close the Master
valve, the Wing valve and the ESD valve.  To provide an additional level of protection
a second sub-system is included, the high-integrity protection sub-system (HIPS).
This sub-system also comprises of 3 pressure sensors, 2 to trip, and 2 isolation valves
labelled HIPS1 and HIPS2.  The HIPS works in an identical manner to the ESD but has
independent pressure sensors. The pressure sensors for each sub-system feed
information into a common computer.
The Cause-Consequence Diagram was constructed following the rules given in section
2.
P2P1 P3 P5P4 P6
MASTER WING HIPS2HIPS1ESD
WELL
ESD SUB-SYSTEM HIPS SUB-SYSTEM
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Component Function Failure Modes       λ Mean
Repair
Time
Maintenance
Test Interval
Time
Master Valve To stop high pressure
surge passing through
system
Valve fails open:
VM
1.14x10-5
36.0 4360
Wing Valve To stop high pressure
surge passing through
system
Valve fails open:
VW
1.14x10-5
36.0 4360
ESD Valve To stop high pressure
surge passing through
system
Valve fails open:
VE
5.44x10-6
36.0 4360
HIPS1 Valve To stop high pressure
surge passing through
system
Valve fails open:
VH1
5.44x10-6
36.0 4360
HIPS2 Valve To stop high pressure
surge passing through
system
Valve fails open:
VH2
5.44x10-6
36.0 4360
Solenoid To supply power to
valves
Fails Energized:
SM,SW,SE,SH1
,SH2
5.0x10-6 36.0 4360
Relay Contacts To supply power to
solenoids (2 per
solenoid)
Fails Closed R1-
R10
0.23x10-6
36.0 4360
Pressure
Sensors
Indicates the level of
pressure to the
computer
Fails to record
actual pressure:
P1-P6
1.5x10-6 36.0 4360
Computer Reads information
sent from pressure
sensors and acts to
close appropriate
values
Fails to read or
act on
information:  C 1x10-5 36.0
4360
Table 2 Component Functions for HIPS System
Steps 1 and 2 Event Ordering and Cause-Consequence Diagram Construction
The ordering was based on the action of components which could perform the task
required by the system i.e. Master Valve, Wing Valve, ESD Valve, HIPS1 Valve,
HIPS2 Valve.  The Cause-Consequence Diagram was constructed by considering the
functionality of each valve and their effect on the system .  Following the removal of
all redundant decision boxes the minimal cause-consequence structure was created
(Figure 9).  The fault trees developed for each decision box are illustrated in figure 10a
and 10b.
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Master Valve
Shuts               1
 NO      YES
High Pressure
Surge
SD
Ft1
Wing Valve
Shuts               2
 NO      YES
SD
Ft2
ESD Valve
Shuts               3
 NO      YES
Ft3
SDHIPS1 Valve
Shuts               4
 NO      YES
Ft4
SDHIPS2 Valve
Shuts               5
 NO      YES
Ft5
SD
HP
SD = Shutdown
HP = High Pressure Surge
Figure 9 Cause-Consequence Diagram for HIPS System
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Figure 10a Fault Trees for Cause-Consequence Diagram for ESD sub-system
Ft1 Ft2
Ft3
Master Valve
Fails Open
G1
No instruction
to close
G2
Valve Fails
VM
Solenoid
Energise d
R1
Power to
Solenoid
G3
Power to
Contacts
G5
Computer
Fails
C
Pressure Sensors
Fail
G6
SM
R2
P3
P2
P1
Relay Contacts
Fail
G4
2
WingValve
Fa ils Open
G7
No ins truction
to close
G8
Valve Fails
VW
Solenoid
Energised
R3
Power to
Solenoid
G9
Power to
Contacts
G11
Computer
Fa ils
C
Press ure Sensors
Fail
G12
SW
R4
P3
P2
P1
Relay Contacts
Fa il
G10
2
E SD Valve
Fails Open
G13
No instruction
to close
G14
Valve Fails
VE
Solenoid
Energised
R5
Power to
Solenoid
G15
Power to
Contacts
G17
Computer
Fails
C
Pressure Sensors
Fail
G18
SE
R6
P3
P2
P1
Relay Contacts
Fail
G16
2
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      Figure 10b Fault Trees for Cause-Consequence Diagram for HIPS sub-system
Following the construction of the Cause-Consequence Diagram, each sequence path is
inspected and any common independent subtrees or basic events are identified.  The
first sequence path inspected in the HIPS system identified that a common submodule
was present in Ft1, Ft2 and Ft3, namely G6, G12 and G18 respectively.  Extraction of
this common submodule results in the Cause-Consequence Diagram depicted in figure
11 with corresponding fault trees shown in figure 12.
From this new version of the Cause-Consequence Diagram for the HIPS system, all
sequence paths were investigated and modified accordingly using the rules outlined in
section 4.
The final Cause-Consequence Diagram is illustrated in figure 13, with corresponding
fault trees shown in figure 14.  This is now in a form where each path contains
independent events in the decision boxes and can be quantified with ease.  The
probability of a high pressure surge could now be obtained by summing the
probabilities of ending in the consequence HP, which was reached via 5 mutually
exclusive paths.  Therefore
Probability (High Pressure)  =  P(Path i)
i
n
=
∑
1
Ft4 Ft5HIPS1Valve
Fails Open
G19
No instruct ion
to close
G20
Val ve Fails
VH1
Solenoid
Energised
R7
Power to
Solenoid
G21
Power to
C ontact s
G23
Computer
Fails
C
Pressure Sensors
Fail
G24
SH1
R8
P6
P5
P4
R elay Contacts
Fail
G22
2
HIPS2 Valve
Fails Open
G25
No inst ruction
to close
G26
Valve Fails
VH2
Solenoid
Energi sed
R9
Power to
So lenoid
G27
Power to
Contact s
G29
C omputer
Fails
C
Pressure Sensors
Fail
G30
SH2
R10
P6
P5
P4
Relay Contacts
Fail
G28
2
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Component failures on the safety system are unrevealed and tested and repaired on
scheduled maintenance.  Their failure probabilities are given by equation (1).
Qi = λ τ
θ
i +
 2 (1)
The system unavailability was calculated as 2.216x10-2.  The figure is identical to that
produce by the FTA and BDD methods.  This result does not reflect poorly on the
Cause-Consequence Diagram method, in comparison to the FTA method, it merely
emphasizes the fact that this particular system can be failed by a single component,
the computer.  The remaining minimal cut sets are of order 4 or more and therefore
have little effect on the overall system unavailability.  For a system that contained a
large number of small order minimal cut sets it can be stated that the Cause-
Consequence Diagram method would yield a more accurate result than that obtained
via FTA.  The Cause-Consequence Diagram produced is of a similar form to that of the
BDD for the system, however the Cause-Consequence Diagram is more concise due to
extract of common submodules rather than extraction of each basic events present in
the submodule.
6. Conclusion
An algorithm has been developed that will produce the correct Cause-Consequence
Diagram and calculate the exact system failure probability for static systems with
binary success or failure responses to the trigger event.  This is achieved without
having to construct the fault tree of the system and retains the documented failure logic
of the system.
The Cause-Consequence Diagram is reduced to a minimal form by firstly removing any
redundant decision boxes and secondly by manipulating any common failure events
which exist on the same path.  The common failure events can be extracted as common
submodules or individual events.  This process is equivalent to constructing the Fault
Tree, converting it to a BDD and identifying and extracting independent submodules.
The minimised Cause-Consequence Diagram is then analysed using a BDD analysis
procedure.  Thus exact rather than approximate calculations are performed.
The advantages of the Cause-Consequence Diagram are:
! The diagram can be constructed directly from the system description
! Dependencies in the system can be incorporated in the analysis
! The system is modularised to increase efficiency
! Exact calculation procedures are adopted
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Figure 11 Reduced Cause-Consequence Diagram for HIPS System
Master Valve
Shuts               7
 NO      YES
High Pressure
Surge
SD
Ft7
Wing Valve
Shuts               8
 NO      YES
SD
Ft8
ESD Valve
Shuts               9
 NO      YES
Ft9
SDHIPS1 Valve
Shuts               10
 NO      YES
Ft10
SDHIPS2 Valve
Shuts               11
 NO      YES
Ft11
SD
HP
SD = Shutdown
HP = High Pressure Surge
Pressure Sensor
submod ule works     6     
 NO           YES
Ft6
HIPS1 Valve
Shuts               4
 NO      YES
Ft4
SDHIPS2 Valve
Shuts               5
 NO      YES
Ft5
SD
HP
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Figure 12 Fault Trees Ft6-Ft11 for figure 11
Ft6 Ft7 Ft8
Ft10 = Ft4
Ft11 = Ft5
      Ft9
Master Valve
Fails
Solenoid
Energised
Valve
F ails
VM
Solenoid
Fails
R 1
P ower to
S olenoid
Computer
Fails
SM
R2
Relays Fail
Closed
Pressure
Transmitters
fail
P3
P2
P1
C
Wing Valve
Fails
Solenoid
Energised
Valve
Fails
VW
Solenoid
Fails
R3
Power to
Solenoid
Computer
Fails
SW
R4
Relays Fail
Closed
C
ESD Valve
Fails
Solenoid
Energised
Valve
Fails
VE
S olenoid
Fails
R5
Power to
Solenoid
Computer
Fails
S E
R6
Relays Fail
Closed
C
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               Figure 13 Final Cause-Consequence Diagram for the HIPS System
Computer
Works         15
 NO      YES
High Pressure
Surge
HP
Ft15
SD = Shutdown
HP = High Pressure Surge
EDS Pressure Sensor
submodule works   6
 NO           YESFt6
HIPS1 Valve
Shuts           13
 NO      YESFt13
SDHIPS2 Valve
Shuts           14
 NO      YESFt14
SD
HP
Master Valve
Shuts          16
 NO      YES
SD
Ft16
Wing Valve
Shuts          17
 NO      YES
SD
Ft17
HIPS Pressure sensor
and computer
submod ule wor ks   12
 NO          YES
Ft12
HP
ESD Valve
Shuts          18
 NO      YES
SD
Ft18
HIPS Pressure
sensor submodule
works                 21
 NO      YES
HP
Ft21
HIPS1 Valve
Shuts          22
 NO      YESFt22
HIPS2 Valve
Shuts          23
 NO      YES
HP
Ft23
SD
SD
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Figure 14 Fault Trees for figure 13
